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Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated 
individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by 
analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation 
and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by 
Inglehart & Baker (American Sociological Review 2000, pp. 19-51)). We use analysis of 
variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual 
heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a 
substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and 
group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that 
cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical 
environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities. 
JEL-Code: C92, D64, D79, H41, Z10, Z13. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Many important social problems of mankind – from interactions in the workplace to tackling 
climate change – involve the cooperation of genetically unrelated individuals in situations in 
which collective welfare is jeopardized by individual self interest. According to one model of 
human social behaviour, self-interest is a dominant behavioural force and therefore welfare-
enhancing cooperation is doomed to fail, unless well defined small groups interact indefinitely 
(which allows for targeted punishment by withdrawing cooperation, see Axelrod (1984); 
Fudenberg & Maskin (1986); Sigmund (2010)). Numerous behavioural experiments, as for 
example surveyed in Fehr et al. (2002b), Fehr & Fischbacher (2004), and Gächter & Herrmann 
(2009), and other empirical studies (see, e.g., Gintis et al. (2005)) have shown that this 
prediction is way too pessimistic and that much more cooperation exists than is easily 
compatible with the selfishness assumption. This is particularly true in the presence of 
punishment opportunities. Many people are willing to exert costly punishment of people whose 
behaviour they dislike, even when there is no material benefit whatsoever for doing so. 
However, recent research also suggests that there is substantial individual heterogeneity with 
regard to pro-social behaviour, in particular in the context of cooperation (e.g., Fischbacher et 
al. (2001); Kurzban & Houser (2005); Bardsley & Moffatt (2007); Kocher et al. (2008); Muller 
et al. (2008); Herrmann & Thöni (2009); Fischbacher & Gächter (2010); see Bergmuller et al, 
this volume, for a discussion of personality and cooperation). Such inter-individual differences 
have a potential of explaining aggregate behaviour and group-level differences (e.g., Gächter & 
Thöni (2005); Kurzban & Houser (2005); Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007); Fischbacher & Gächter 
(2010)) and may play a major role for the stability of cooperation (McNamara & Leimar, this 
volume). 
An interesting next approach is to jump from the “micro-level” to the “macro-level” and to 
ask whether there are also differences in cooperation behaviour across cultural backgrounds. 
When we speak of the “cultural background” we have those sets of beliefs and values in mind 
the majority of people in these societies hold and that get “transmitted fairly unchanged from 
generation to generation” (Guiso et al. (2006), p. 23). In particular, influential social scientists 
like Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart & Baker (2000) argue on the basis of data from the World 
Values Survey that there are distinct cultural areas in the world, reflected in people’s value 
systems.  The question we ask in this paper is whether there are differences in experimentally 
observed cooperation behaviour across distinct world cultures.
1 
To answer this question we will analyze a data set of highly comparable cross-cultural 
experiments conducted by Herrmann et al. (2008a) with more than 1100 participants in sixteen 
  2subject pools from six distinct cultural areas around the world.  All participants played finitely 
repeated public good experiments with and without punishment in stable groups, in a design 
inspired by Fehr & Gächter (2000). This data set, which we describe in Section 2 in more detail, 
along with our methodology of classifying subject pools according to cultural areas, allows us 
to disentangle the relative importance of individual heterogeneity, group-level differences, and 
cultural heterogeneity for cooperation. To our knowledge, such an analysis has not been done 
before.  
In principle, survey methods could also be applied to uncover cross-cultural differences. 
However, subjects do not have an incentive to admit their true social preferences when it costs 
nothing to pass for being cooperative and pro-social. When surveyed, presumably only a few 
people would admit to being selfish. By contrast, behavioural experiments have the advantage 
that actual behaviour rather than stated intentions is observed. In experiments participants can, 
depending on their decisions, earn considerable amounts of money. Thus, the laboratory allows 
observing real decision making under controlled circumstances. Moreover, our goal of 
disentangling individual heterogeneity, group-level differences and cultural variation demands 
a laboratory experimental approach.
 2 
Why might the cultural background matter at all for cooperation? This is an interesting 
question because the Homo economicus model mentioned above suggests that cultural 
background does not matter: selfishness is universal. The fact that not all people are selfish has 
recently inspired theoretical models of social preferences which take this heterogeneity into 
account (see, e.g., Fehr & Schmidt (2006) for a survey). Yet, these models are also mute with 
respect to the influence of cultural background. In general, economists, with some exceptions 
(e.g., Roth et al. (1991) in a seminal study) have not been interested in cultural differences.  
This is now changing (for a succinct survey see Fernández (2008)). The reasons are theoretical 
developments (e.g., Greif (1994); Bowles (1998); Bednar & Page (2007); Guiso et al. (2008); 
Tabellini (2008b)), and better data, both experimental (e.g., Henrich et al. (2001); Oosterbeek 
et al. (2004)) and non-experimental (Guiso et al. (2006); Fernández (2007); Tabellini (2008a)). 
By contrast, psychologists have established many profound differences in human behaviour 
and thinking across cultures (see, e.g., the reviews by Markus & Kitayama (1991); Nisbett & 
Cohen (1996); Cohen (2001); Nisbett (2003); Henrich et al. (forthcoming); Heine & Buchtel 
(2009); and Heine & Ruby (2010)).  For example, in a recent paper Henrich et al. (forthcoming) 
show that Western subjects, which are most frequently used in behavioural experiments, are 
actually often the outlier in the range of observed behaviours. Thus, it is an obvious question 
whether there are also differences in cooperation behaviour across different world cultures. 
Moreover, evolutionary psychological approaches predict the possibility of cultural differences 
  3because people have an evolved psychology that allows them to attune their behaviour to the 
norms, expectations, and (sanctioning) behaviours of others around them (e.g., Boyd & 
Richerson (2005); Gintis (forthcoming); Henrich (2004); Henrich & Henrich (2007); Herrmann 
et al. (2007); Nettle (2009); Tomasello et al. (2005); Tomasello (2009); Rendell et al. (2010)). 
From what we know from numerous experiments we can speculate about potential 
behavioural channels of cultural influences. First, in the context of cooperation many 
experiments have shown that people are conditional cooperators who cooperate more the more 
they believe others will cooperate (e.g., Croson (2007); Gächter (2007); Fischbacher & Gächter 
(2010)). Any factor that influences beliefs might also influence cooperation. This is also true of 
framing effects (e.g., Dufwenberg et al. (2006)) or, more generally, contextual cues, of which 
the cultural background is an important example. For example, subjects in a public good 
experiment in Kenya termed the neutrally framed experiment as “harambee”, their word for 
community work (Henrich et al. (2005)). The way naturally occurring cooperation problems 
are normally solved in society might influence people’s beliefs about how others will behave. 
Second, from experiments in which punishment was possible, we know that substantial 
differences in punishment across subject pools in different cultures can exist and even be 
anticipated prior to any experience in the particular situation (see, e.g., Gächter et al. (2005) 
and Gächter & Herrmann (2009) who ran experiments in Russia and Switzerland). Consistent 
with this observation, Herrmann et al. (2008a), in experiments which we will analyze in detail 
below, showed a large diversity of punishment patterns across different subject pools around 
the world, resulting in vastly different cooperation levels.  
We are of course not the first to investigate cultural influences on cooperation behaviour, 
or pro-sociality in general (see, e.g., Oosterbeek et al. (2004)). Particularly noteworthy are the 
seminal large-scale studies conducted in small-scale societies around the world (Henrich et al. 
(2001); Henrich et al. (2005); Henrich et al. (2006); Henrich et al. (2010)).
3 While Henrich 
and his co-workers mostly used simple bargaining games and conducted their experiments with 
members of small-scale societies, the experiments we will analyze were all conducted in large-
scale developed societies. The small-scale societies differ among each other in the extent to 
which cooperation is important for economic production (e.g., cooperative whale-hunting vs. 
individual hunting and gathering); how strong market integration is (how many calories are 
bought on the market?); the size of communities; and adherence to a world religion (Henrich et 
al. (2010)). Differences on these dimensions explain a large part of the variation that is 
observed in experimental bargaining games in these small-scale societies (Henrich et al. (2005); 
Henrich et al. (2010)). Modern developed societies hardly differ on the dimensions of market 
integration and reliance on cooperation, for all modern societies know division of labour and 
  4trade between non-kin (Richerson & Boyd (1999)). Thus, in comparison to the small-scale 
societies the cultural influence we identify does not come from fundamental differences in 
socio-economic structures but from historical, religious, political and value differences, which 
Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) classification of cultural areas around the world, or Hofstede’s 
(2001) “cultural dimensions” try to capture.  
Another distinguishing feature of our approach from previous cross-cultural economics 
experiments is that many of them test specific (proximate) hypotheses that are derived from the 
compared cultures (Bohnet et al. (2008); Bohnet et al. (2010); Buchan et al. (2002); Buchan et 
al. (2009); Chuah et al. (2007); Chuah et al. (2009); Hayashi et al. (1999); Holm & Danielson 
(2005); Kachelmeier & Shehata (1997); Yamagishi (1988); Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994); 
Yamagishi et al. (1998); Wu et al. (2009)). Our approach is different since our goal is to 
understand a more fundamental issue – do we find evidence that comparable subjects from 
modern developed societies that are characterized by large-scale cooperation but differ strongly 
with regard to historical and cultural values behave differently in games of cooperation? This 
question is motivated by evolutionary theories of cooperation (Henrich (2004); Henrich & 
Henrich (2007); Nowak (2006); Sober & Wilson (1998)) rather than proximate mechanisms of 
cultural differences.  
The typical methodology of cross-cultural experiments is to observe a comparable 
subject pool in different societies. The idea is to run experiments in a way that minimizes 
variations due to subject pool composition or experimental procedures.  In this way any 
differences that might be observed between cross-societal subject pools are likely due to 
differences in the cultural background of the compared societies. Our methodology, which we 
describe in more detail in the next section, builds on this idea but refines it in two ways. First, 
the data of Herrmann et al. (2008a) were collected in six distinct cultural areas according to 
Inglehart & Baker (2000) and Hofstede (2001). Thus, rather than comparing two cultures we 
compare six cultures. Second, we do not identify culture by nationality, because different 
nations can share largely similar cultural backgrounds. The cultural classification of Inglehart 
& Baker (2000) gives us at least two different societies in each of the six cultures; in three 
cultural areas we have data from subject pools from three different societies and in three 
cultural areas from two different societies. In one culture, “Protestant Europe”, we have data 
from four subject pools from three countries (in Switzerland we have data from two subject 
pools, St. Gallen and Zurich). This structure of our data allows us to compare within-cultural 
variation with between-cultural variation, which is impossible if there is only one subject pool 
per society or cultural area.
4 
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exist highly significant differences between cultures. This is true in public good experiments 
with and without punishment and also holds for punishment behaviour. This dual observation 
of within-culture similarity and cross-cultural heterogeneity is the main support for the claim 
that there are cultural influences on cooperation.  
 
2. THE DATA AND OUR APPROACH  
In the following we first describe the most important details of the design of Herrmann et al. 
(2008a), followed by the details of our classification of cultural areas. Our third step is a 
description of our main statistical approach for discerning the importance of cultural 
background for cooperation and punishment.  
We start with the details of the experimental design which was motivated by the 
observations from Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr & Gächter (2000) and Fehr & Gächter (2002) 
who showed that the punishment mechanism has dramatic impacts on contributions in the 
public goods game. All subjects took part in two experiments, each lasting for ten periods. The 
first experiment always was a public good experiment with no punishment opportunities (we 
call this the “N-condition”). The second experiment was a public good experiment with a 
punishment opportunity (the “P-condition”). Both experiments were played in stable groups of 
four subjects for 10 periods. In both experiments subjects received an endowment of 20 ECU 
(experimental currency unit) in each period. All subjects decided simultaneously how many 
ECU they wanted to contribute to a public good. All contributions in a group were summed up 
and multiplied by 1.6. The resulting amount of ECU was divided equally among all subjects in 
the group. A subject's payoff consisted of the ECUs he or she did not contribute plus his share 
of the public good. In the N-condition the stage game ended here and subjects moved on to the 
next period. Note that in this game it is individually rational (assuming selfish preferences) to 
contribute nothing to the public good: for every unit contributed a subject earns only .4 units in 
return. However, joint income is maximized if all subjects contribute their entire endowment to 
the public good. This is due to the fact that the social return of contributing is 1.6 per unit 
contributed.  
In the P-condition there was an additional stage where subjects could reduce each others' 
incomes at their own cost. All subjects learned the contributions of all other group members. 
Subjects could then assign punishment points to each other group member. Each punishment 
point reduced the income of the punished group member by three ECUs. However, punishment 
  6was also costly to the punisher. Each punishment point cost the punisher one ECU. For further 
details, the procedures and the instructions we refer the reader to Herrmann et al. (2008b). 
Herrmann et al. (2008a) ran these experiments in sixteen different locations with a total of 
1120 participants. The locations are all over the developed world and span a large set of cross-
societal differences (see Herrmann et al. (2008b) for the details). As explained above, subjects 
interacted in stable groups of four members throughout the entire experiment. Therefore, 
groups constitute the independent units of observations on which all our non-parametric tests 
will be based. In total, we have data from 280 groups.  
Herrmann et al. (2008a) designed and ran their experiments in a way that minimizes 
differences in behaviour that come from subject pool composition or experimental procedures. 
To ensure this, participants were all undergraduates and thereby very similar with regard to age, 
education, and their socio-economic situation in their respective society. Gender composition 
was also similar in most subject pools. Thus, any variation we observe between subject pools 
or cultural regions are unlikely due to differences in subject pool composition. Similarly, to 
minimize behavioural variability as introduced by experimental procedures Herrmann et al. 
(2008a) followed standard practices of cross-cultural experiments as introduced to 
experimental economics by Roth et al. (1991). A detailed discussion of these issues can be 
found in Herrmann et al. (2008b).  
An important conceptual step for our purposes is to classify locations into cultural regions 
according to cultural proximity. To avoid being arbitrary we rely on seminal research by 
Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart & Baker (2000), who use data from the World Values Survey to 
identify clusters in world cultures. According to Inglehart & Baker (2000), societies can be 
characterised by two dimensions: “traditional vs. secular-rational values” and “survival vs. 
self-expression values”. The first refers to people’s attitudes on topics like abortion, national 
pride, obedience, and respect for authorities; the latter refers to attitudes on the importance of 
economic and physical security over self-expression and quality-of-life; homosexuality, 
happiness and trust. Table 1 shows the countries where our data stems from and their cultural 
classification. Where available, we take the classification from the Global Cultural Map 
(Inglehart & Baker (2000), p.29, Figure 1). This allows us to classify all countries in the 
cultural areas "English speaking", "Protestant Europe", "Orthodox/Ex-Communist", and 
"Confucian". Among the four remaining countries, only Turkey appears in Inglehart & Baker 
(2000). An alternative source of information about cultural differences are the four cultural 
dimensions (power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance) defined by 
Hofstede (2001). Using these four dimensions strongly suggests pairing Greece and Turkey. If 
we calculate the Euclidian distance then Turkey is the third closest country to Greece in a 
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two Arabic subject pools into the category "Arabic-speaking". 
Before we continue, a caveat is in order. Classifications are always to some extent open to 
criticism, and Inglehart & Baker (2000) are aware of this (see their discussion on pp. 32-40). 
We believe, however, that this classification makes a lot of sense in particular because the 
identified cultural clusters all share some common history and four of the clusters also share a 
common language. Moreover, the identified clusters are also similar with regard to other 
measures of cultural similarity, like Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions (Hofstede (2001)), or 
norms of civic cooperation, the strength of the rule of law, or democracy (see Herrmann et al. 
(2008b), in particular Table S1). There is no detailed information on the Arabic countries, but 
Hofstede groups them under “Arab world” (Hofstede’s sample does not include Oman, but its 




Our main interest is in whether there are cultural differences in contribution decisions and 
how important they are, if they exist. To analyze these questions our empirical strategy will be 
two-fold. We first describe the data using graphical tools and non-parametric tests to analyze 
whether there are cultural differences, that is, systematic patterns of different contributions to 
public good according to the cultural areas defined above. Cultural differences exist if the 
variation between cultures is larger than the variation within cultures. Therefore, we will 
provide tests of behaviour within a culture as well as tests between cultures. If behaviour is 
very homogeneous within culture but different across cultures, we should not find statistically 
significant differences within culture but significant differences between cultures. Notice, 
however, that homogeneity within culture and differences across cultures are only sufficient for 
the existence of cultural differences. Significant between-cultural differences can still exist 
even if there are significant within-cultural differences, provided the within-cultural differences 
are “small enough” relative to the between-cultural differences.  
The existence of cultural differences does not yet tell us how “big” they are, also relative 
to the importance of individual variation and variation that is due to differences between 
groups. For that purpose we use a nested analysis of variance (ANOVA) model to attribute the 
amount of variance in the contributions explained by cultural variations, group differences, and 
individual heterogeneity. Our basic linear model underlying the ANOVA uses the exogenous 
variables Period, Culture, Group, and Individual (Period is the period number, Culture is a 
categorical variable to identify the six cultural clusters, and Individual (Group) are dummy 
  8variables for each individual (group)). Individual is nested in Group and Group is nested in 
Culture. We use the ANOVA to disentangle the coefficient of determination to separate the 
explanatory power of our exogenous variables in the N- and the P-condition.
5 Our approach 
not only allows us to measure the explanatory power of cultural variation, but also allows us to 
compare the importance of cultural variation relative to individual and group influences. 
 
3. Results  
The main results of the first part of our analysis, which concerns the existence of culture effects, 
are contained in Figures 1 to 4. Recall that we argued that cultural differences in contributions 
exist if contributions are more similar within a culture than between cultures. In our analysis 
we separate the data according to the cultural categorization summarized in Table 1 and 
according to treatment condition.  
We start with Figure 1 and the N-condition. The left part of each panel shows the results 
for the N-condition; ‘c’ indicates the average contribution over the ten periods. Within all 
cultures contributions are remarkably similar. According to Kruskal-Wallis tests based on 
group average contributions across all periods, contributions within a culture are at most 
weakly significant (in two cultures) and insignificant in four cultures (see p-values indicated in 
the panels of Figure 1). Between cultures, however, contributions are highly significantly 
different (Kruskal-Wallis test with group averages as independent observations and culture as 
the grouping variable; χ
2(5)=30.9, p=0.0001). We interpret this as unambiguous evidence for 
cultural influences on cooperation in the absence of punishment.  
This difference concerns the average level of cooperation. However, all subject pools 
experience a decline of contributions in the N-condition over time (except subjects in Athens 
and the two Arabic subject pools, where contributions appear more stable). The explanation of 
the decline of cooperation is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer the reader to Neugebauer 
et al. (2009) and Fischbacher & Gächter (2010) for analyses of the almost ubiquitous decline 
of cooperation in finitely repeated public good games. To test whether there are also cultural 
differences with regard to the extent of the decline of cooperation, we calculated for each 
independent group a Spearman rank order correlation of group average contribution and period. 
We use this correlation coefficient as a test statistic in a Kruskal-Wallis test with the cultural 
regions as the test groups. We find highly significant differences (χ
2(5)=42.1, p=0.0001).  
We now turn to the analysis of the P-condition (illustrated in the right part of each panel). 
Within a culture the temporal patterns are surprisingly similar. In some of the cultures there is 
also an indication of significant within-culture variation: cooperation levels are significantly 
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levels are highly significantly different (Kruskal-Wallis test with group averages as 
independent observations and culture as the grouping variable; χ




Figure 1 (and Figures 3 and 4 below) also suggest that there are cultural differences with 
regard to the change of contributions between the N-condition and the P-condition: in four 
cultures contributions are significantly higher in the P-condition than in the N-condition (with 
p<.002) whereas in two cultures this change is not significant (with p>.459, Wilcoxon signed 
ranks tests with group averages as independent observations (see the p-values for “change” 
indicated in Figure 1). 
We conclude from this analysis that there are cultural differences in contributions, in 
particular in the P-condition. The major part of these cultural differences in the P-condition is 
most likely due to differences in punishment.  Antisocial behaviour increasingly attracts 
attention in the study of cooperation (Jensen this volume) but the role of culture remains little 
explored. Herrmann et al. (2008a), Table 1, show that contributions are strongly linked to 
patterns of punishment. In particular they show that contributions in the P-condition depend (i) 
positively on the initial contribution, (ii) positively on the extent of punishment of free riding 
behaviour, and (iii) negatively on antisocial punishment, that is punishment of people who 
contributed the same or more than the punishing individual. Herrmann et al. (2008a) also show 
that antisocial punishment is strongly linked to norms of civic cooperation in a given society as 
measured by representative questionnaires in the World Values Survey and the strength of the 
rule of law in a country (see Herrmann et al. (2008b) for further details and references). Both 
measures differ strongly between the societies of the subject pools of Herrmann et al. (2008a). 
Thus, (antisocial) punishment seems to be linked to the societal background. This observation 
begs the question of cultural differences in punishment behaviour. Herrmann et al. (2008a) 
have already shown that there are only weakly significant differences in punishment of free 
riding behaviour and highly significant differences in antisocial punishment across subject 
pools. Are there cultural differences in punishment if we apply our concept of cultural 
differences?  
Figure 2 depicts the extent of average punishment of free riding behaviour as well as of 
antisocial punishment per subject pool and grouped for the six cultural areas. Interestingly, 
with one exception, there are no significant differences in both free rider punishment and 
antisocial punishment within cultures (based on Kruskal-Wallis tests). Moreover, we find 
  10significant differences in punishment across cultures for free rider punishment (χ
2(5)=11.2, 





In addition to the culture-specific changes in contributions between conditions, Figures 3 
and 4 illustrate two further features of the data which we will analyze in more detail in the next 
step. Figure 3 focuses on the distribution of individual average contributions and shows that in 
the cultures in which punishment leads to a significant behavioural change, the variance of 
individual contributions is reduced as well. Not very surprisingly, punishment, when it “works”, 
makes people’s contributions more similar (and increases the level of contributions), whereas 
no such homogenizing effect is visible when punishment is ineffective. In two cultures, the 




Figure 4 illustrates how group average contributions are distributed between conditions 
and cultures. This is interesting because cooperation in the Herrmann et al. (2008a) 
experiments happened in groups with fixed memberships over time and groups might have 
been “locked” into a particular path-dependent contribution pattern, for example due to a 
frequent tendency of conditional cooperation (e.g., Gächter & Thöni (2005); Kurzban & 
Houser (2005); Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007); Fischbacher & Gächter (2010)). Such path 
dependency might lead to substantially different group average contributions, and therefore to 
large between-group variance. Moreover, the presence of punishment might affect both the 
between-group variance (by making groups more homogenous) and the within-group variance. 
We find that the introduction of punishment reduces the within-group variance in all six 
cultures. The effect on the between-group variance is more diverse: in four of the six cultures 




We conclude from this descriptive analysis that cultural differences in contribution 
decisions exist without doubt. In our next step we are interested in the relative fraction of the 
variance that is due to individuals, groups, and in particular culture in contributions in both the 
N- and the P-condition. For this purpose we use the nested ANOVA model described in 
  11Section 2 to decompose the explanatory power of our measure for culture, group composition, 
and individual differences.  
Figure 5 shows the R
2 associated to our explanatory variables for the N- and the P-
condition. It measures the sum of squares associated with the explanatory variable divided by 
the total sum of squares in the contribution decisions.  Bar heights depict the fraction of the 
variance that is explained by the corresponding variable. The lowest part of a bar depicts the 
fraction of the variance explained by Culture. In the N-condition the cultural variation in our 
subject pool explains only a small amount of the variance (3.9 percent). Group level 
differences (that is, between-group variance) account for additional 29.3 percent of the 
variation in contributions, and further 16.0 percent can be explained by individual fixed effects. 
Time effects account for 7.4 percent of the variation. Finally, 43.4 percent of the variation 
remains unexplained by our model.  
Comparing the results of the N-condition to the results of the P-condition reveals striking 
differences. First, a much smaller portion of the variance in contributions remains unexplained. 
Individual and period effects lose much of their explanatory power while Group and Culture 
gain in importance. In particular, the percentage of the variance explained by our cultural 




Are these fractions of explained variance large? This is an important question, because 
even in the absence of any systematic cultural, group or individual effects the ANOVA model 
would provide some non-zero R
2. We ran 100 ANOVAs with simulated contributions (all 
contributions in 0,1,...,20 were drawn with equal probability). The explanatory power of 
Culture in the absence of systematic cultural variation is very close to zero (mean: .043%, 
sd: .025). Consequently, the influence of Culture is far beyond the effect that would show up in 





4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we analyzed an experimental data set by Herrmann et al. (2008a) who ran 
comparable public good experiments with and without punishment in sixteen subject pools 
from six distinct cultural areas around the world. This data set allows us to show that cultural 
differences in cooperation exist in the sense that within-cultural variation is smaller than the 
between-cultural variation. Moreover, we found that for the extent of cooperation we observe, 
  12cultural variation is a particularly important source of variation in the presence of punishment 
opportunities. This is due to large cultural differences in punishment. In the absence of 
punishment individual (“micro-level”) variation is much more important than cultural (“macro-
level”) variation, whereas the opposite is true in the presence of punishment. Group-level 
differences (the “meso-level”) are very important both in the presence and the absence of 
punishment.  
We know from numerous experiments that individual heterogeneity is an important source 
of variation that can translate into important aggregate-level differences in outcomes (Camerer 
& Fehr (2006); Gächter & Thöni (2010)). Our data set confirms this insight by showing that 
individual variation and group-level variation are both important sources of the overall 
variation. The importance of our finding of culture effects in addition to individual-level and 
group-level differences is that, holding everything else constant, differences in cultural 
background can lead to differences in behaviour in otherwise identical environments. Thus, 
accounting for individual and implied group-level differences is not enough to understand the 
whole breadth of variation in cooperation. Culture needs to be accounted for. 
We conclude with two caveats and future research questions. First, in this analysis we have 
only demonstrated the existence and quantitative importance of cultural differences. Our 
approach cannot explain where the differences come from. Herrmann et al. (2008a) found large 
differences in cooperation only in the presence of punishment and due to large differences in 
punishment across subject pools. Why these cultural differences in punishment occur is an 
interesting task for future research. Second, we have drawn our conclusions from comparing 
subjects who are very similar with regard to their socio-economic status and other socio-
demographic characteristics. However, in every society there exist various social groups who 
might also show a large variation in cooperative behaviour (see, e.g., Ockenfels & Weimann 
(1999); Fehr et al. (2002a); Bellemare & Kröger (2007); Gächter & Herrmann (forthcoming); 
Hong & Bohnet (2007); Hoff et al. (2009); Kocher et al. (2009); Henrich et al. (forthcoming)). 
It is an important task for future research to understand this sort of variation relative to the 
sources of variation we have identified in this paper.  
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Table 1 
 




Nottingham UK  56 




Bonn Germany  60 
Zurich Switzerland  92 





Dnipropetrovs'k Ukraine  44 
Samara Russia  152 
Athens Greece  Southern Europe  44 
Istanbul Turkey  64 
Riyadh Saudi  Arabia  Arabic speaking  48 
Muscat Oman  52 
Seoul South  Korea 
Confucian 
84 
Chengdu China  96 
 
Table 1: Cultural classification of the cities where our data stems from. 
Classification taken and adapted from Inglehart and Baker (2000) and 
Hofstede (2001) (for Southern Europe and Arabic speaking). 
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Figure 1: Average contributions in the 16 subject pools during the 10 periods of the N-
condition and the P-condition; “c” denotes the average contribution across all periods and 
subject pools of a given treatment and culture; “p” denotes the p-value of a Kruskal-Wallis test 
for the equality of contributions of subject pools in a given treatment and culture. “Change” 
denotes the p-value of a Wilcoxon signed rank test for the change of contribution between the 
N-condition and the P-condition. All tests are based on group average contributions over all 
periods of a respective treatment. 




Figure 2: Average expenditures for punishment targeted at subjects with a lower contribution 
(Free rider punishment) and targeted at subjects with a weakly higher contribution (Antisocial 
punishment) than the punishing subject. P-values are from Kruskal Wallis tests for differences 
across subject pools based on the independent group averages. 
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Figure 3: Histograms of individual average contributions in the N- and P-condition for each 
culture. The numbers in each panel indicate the standard deviation of the contributions in a 
culture in the two conditions. To measure the standard deviation of contributions independently 
of the time trend we calculate a standard deviation for each of the ten periods and report the 
average standard deviation across the ten periods.  
 




Figure 4: Histograms of average group contributions per period in the N- and P-condition for 
each culture. The numbers indicate standard deviations of the contributions within a group and 
between groups. For the within group standard deviations we calculate the standard deviations 
of the four contributions in a group in each period and average over all periods and groups 
within a culture. For the between group measure we calculate the standard deviation of all 
group averages within a culture and a period. The numbers show the average over the ten 
periods for the N- and the P-condition. 




Figure 5: Decomposition of the coefficient of determination for contributions in the two 
treatment conditions. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 Gächter et al. (2004); and Thöni et al. (2009) show that, on the individual level and within a given culture, there 
is a connection between questionnaire items as used in the World Values Survey and cooperation in public goods 
games. Such a relationship has also been established in trust games, which also contain an element of cooperation 
(Fehr et al. (2002a); Bellemare & Kröger (2007); Ermisch et al. (2009)). 
2 See Friedman & Sunder (1994) for an introduction to methods in experimental economics; Guala (2005), 
Bardsley et al. (2010), Falk & Heckman (2009), Croson & Gächter (2010) and Smith (2010) for a discussion of 
the methodology of experimental economics. Gächter & Herrmann (2009) provide an overview of experiments on 
cooperation and punishment. 
3 The most important experimental tool in these studies is the ultimatum game (Güth et al. (1982)).  For a 
comprehensive analysis and cross-cultural comparison of ultimatum bargaining games see Oosterbeek et al. 
(2004).  
4 Gächter & Herrmann (2009) applied this methodology to one-shot experiments conducted with students (n=606) 
in two Swiss subject pools and two Russian subject pools. According to several measures, Russia and Switzerland 
are culturally very distinct societies. The results show within-cultural similarity but strong between-cultural 
differences.  
5 In general the ANOVA does not allow for an unambiguous disaggregation of the coefficient of determination. In 
our analysis this is possible because all exogenous variables are orthogonal and our sample is balanced. 
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